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INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1993 the White House Task Force on Health Care
Reform promoted health insurance purchaser alliances as competition-stimulating engines to drive the President's ambitious plans to
restructure the health care sector.' These alliances would have consolidated the purchasing power of the nation's employers, who would
have been required to provide health insurance to virtually all of their
employees. 2 The Administration intended these large, state-based
buyer coalitions to apply powerful competitive pressures to health insurers. Insurers would then be forced to exert pressure derivatively
t
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law, and Professor of Public Health,
Boston University School of Medicine. My thanks to Joseph Brodley for his generous and
perceptive insights on an earlier draft. Claire Breaux, Class of 1995, Boston University
School of Law, provided valuable research support for this article.
1 Health Security Act, Title I, Subtitle D, H.R. 3600, S. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993) [hereinafter HSA].
2 Id. § 1601.
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on providers, who would be compelled to compete vigorously for insurer contracts. This competition would force providers to improve
the efficiency of health service delivery.3 The alliance concept thus
allowed President Clinton to assure the country with a straight face
that we could achieve universal coverage without (much) need for increased health care spending.
Barely half a year later, political last rites were administered to
the mandatory alliance notion. 4 By July of 1994 the Congressional
leadership had informed the President that the Task Force proposal
was effectively dead,5 and by September even the President had
thrown in the towel on health reform. An electorate both weary and
wary of big government seemed all too eager to accept the allegations
of providers, insurers, and others wedded to the status quo that alliances would add a threateningly interventionist layer of bureaucracy
to an already complex health care delivery system.6 The Task Force's
turgid 107-page description of alliances and their functions7 made it
absurdly easy for opponents to portray them as a costly and unwarranted bureaucratic obstacle likely to impede patient access to affordable medical services." The public apparently never understood that
buyer coalitions were the primary cost containment mechanism of the
Clinton plan: Without them Americans could never achieve universal

3 The Administration proposal set forth two forms of purchasing alliances. Regional
alliances would be nonprofit organizations, independent state agencies, or agencies of the
state. HSA, supra note 1, Title I, Subtitle D, Subpart A, § 1301. Corporate alliances could
be sponsored by employers having in excess of 5000 employees, by multiemployer plans
covering in excess of 5000 active participants, or by rural cooperatives. Id. Subpart B,
§ 1311.
4 Clinton Alliances ConsideredDead As Democrats Accept Voluntary Pools, 2 Health Care
Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 20 (May 16, 1994).
5 Stephen Green, Coveragefor All May Not Survive in Health Debate, SAN DIEGO TRIB.,
July 26, 1994, at Al.
6 See Robert E. Patricelli, Managed Care Perspectives: Why Do We Need Health Alliances?,
13 HEALm ArF., 239 (Spring 1994).
7 HSA, supra note 1, Title I, Subtitle D, at 114-221. The proposed legislation is not
altogether clear about whether alliances would actually purchase insurance for employers,
although clearly they would be expected to negotiate the terms and content of purchasing.
8 For example, Alan Katz, former President of the California Association of Health
Underwriters, characterized alliances as follows: "From a consumer's point of view the
alliances are a Frankenstein monster, the result of stitching together the worst aspects of
the public and private sector: bureaucracies and monopolistic cartels. Both lack the incentive to be either cost effective or consumer-friendly." Alan Katz, L.A. TimEs, Feb. 10, 1994,
Letters to the Times, at B6.
Some economists also argued that regional alliances might drive price below marginal
cost, reducing health services in the long run because suppliers would leave the market.
Warren Greenberg, Monopsony Power and Managed Competition: Do Regional Alliances Make
Sense?, 1 J. OF SUBACUTE CARE No. 2, at 37, 40 (1994).
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coverage and still escape paying much higher health insurance premiums or taxes or both.9
The alliance concept may have perished as a mandatory element
of reform on the national level, but its local influence is far from moribund. Many states have enacted legislation designed to spur the creation of health insurance purchaser pools, particularly among small
businesses.' 0 This aggregated purchasing allows companies to maximize their bargaining leverage with insurers. Consequently, an increased percentage of the work force in those states encouraging
purchasing pools will theoretically be covered by health insurance offered through their employers, which means that fewer residents will
end up on state Medicaid rolls. Even without facilitating legislation,
employers throughout the country have voluntarily begun pooling
and analyzing information, and coordinating lobbying and purchasing activity."
Such recent insurance-purchaser collaboration is a case study of
reorganization in the shadow of threatened structural reform. (It also
reflects a more sophisticated purchaser appreciation for the economic
advantages of collaboration in reducing an input to the cost of labor.)
The prospect of government-mandated change spurred a primarily
private-sector response that sought the same economic benefits as the
proposed federal revisions.' 2 To the extent that these voluntary state
and private-sector initiatives can successfully contain costs while maintaining an acceptable quality of care, the need for federal intervention
will diminish accordingly. The access issue may still justify comprehensive national reform, but in the interim, voluntary collaboration
13
among health insurance purchasers will probably become routine.

9 The price controls set forth in the Administration proposal would have been triggered only in the event that alliances were unable to keep premiums relatively low. HSA,
supra note 1, Title VI, Subtitle A.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 42-64.
11 See, e.g., Charles Stein, HMO Rate Freeze Sought; BosTON GLOBE, May 27, 1994, at 81
(describing collaborative health care purchasing in Massachusetts); Health PurchasingCoop
System Proposed by State Attorney General S Health Law Rep. (BNA) 184 (Feb. 10, 1994) (Massachusetts attorney general proposes health insurance purchasing cooperatives for busi-

nesses with fewer than 100 employees).
12 An analogous phenomenon can be observed among providers as they scramble to
integrate both horizontally and vertically in response to the threat of pending legislative
reform. See Milt Freudenheim, HealthIndustY is ChangingItselfAhead of Reform, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 1994, at Al. Academic medicine is restructuring in response to change as well.
See Leigh Page, Shaking the Ivoiy Tower, Am. MED. NEws, July 18, 1994, at 1.
13 Cf. Charles E. Mueller, Presidency at Risk from an Antitrust Blunder? Health-Care "Consolidation" Poses a '96 PriceDisaster,25 ANrrausT L. & ECON. Rv. 1 (1994) (arguing that
President Clinton's "consolidation strategy" for the health sector will be counter productive because doctors and hospitals will consolidate into giant, inefficient provider entities
in response to aggregated purchaser power).
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Antitrust concerns figured prominently in the immediate and intense political backlash against mandatory alliances. These alliances
were portrayed as monopsonistic behemoths that would inevitably coerce health care insurers and providers into restricting necessary services because they would have sufficient power to push prices below
competitive levels. 14 Many providers would consequently be forced to
exit the market, while those that remained would be compelled to
reduce costs at the expense of quality. Some observers therefore asserted that the mandatory purchasing pools should be considered anticompetitive, even though most of them were to operate behind a
governmental facade. 15 Antitrust theory provided an expedient instrument for attacking alliances, for it condemns not just agreements
among competitors that unlawfully restrain trade, 16 but also the illegal
acquisition of monopsony power. 17 At first glance, buyer coalitions
look suspiciously like vehicles through which competing purchasers
can collude to lower the price they have to pay for health insurance.
Moreover, the larger the coalition, the easier it is to characterize its
behavior as monopsonistic.
Since huge regional or corporate alliances would have been virtually the only negotiators for health insurance under the Clinton plan,
they clearly would have wielded considerable market power.' 8 Doctors and hospitals therefore demanded a level antitrust playing field as
a matter of fairness.' 9 They sought to defend their economic interests
by claiming the right to negotiate collectively on price and other issues, even when they ordinarily competed with one another for the
same business from the identical insurers and patients. 20 The Task
Force implicitly acknowledged the impact of mandatory alliance
14 Potentialfor Monopsony Raised by Health Alliances Under Reform Plan, 1 Health Care
Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 466 (May 10, 1993).
15 See discussion on implied immunity and the state action exemption infra part IV.B.
16 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
'7
Id§2.
18 Robert E. Bloch & Donald M. Falk, Antitrst, Competition, and Health CareReform, 13
HEALTH AnF. 206, 207-10 (Spring 1994).
19 Brian McCormick, Managed Care and Medicine in 'Fairness' itght AM. MED. NEws,
May 9, 1994, at 1.
20 Cf FredricJ. Entin et al., HospitalCollaboration:The Need for an AppropriateAntitrust
Policy, 29 WAKx Fonasr L. REv. 107 (1994) (American Hospital Association's analysis of
antitrust barriers to provider collaboration and call for reexamination of antitrust enforcement policies). The Health Care Antitrust Improvements Act of 1993, introduced by Senators Orrin Hatch and Strom Thurmond, attempted to "level the antitrust playing field" to
permit collaborative provider response to consolidated purchaser power. S. 1658, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (establishing antitrust safe harbors for certain activities of doctors,
hospitals, HMOs, private, state & local cooperative ventures). The American Hospital Association ultimately opposed the bill, coming out against "statutory antitrust exemptions
for physicians." Letter from AHA Executive Vice President Rick Pollack to Sen. Patrick
Moynihan, reportedin Brian McCormack & Sharon McIlrath, Hospitalsvs. Doctors?, AM. MEn.
NEws, July 4, 1994, at 1, 22.
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purchasing muscle on providers not aligned with a health service network to represent them in negotiations with the insurance industry,
and threw them an antitrust bone. The administration's bill permitted those providers choosing to participate in fee-for-service health
insurance plans2 1 to bargain collectively with regional alliances for fee
22
schedules, purportedly protected from antitrust exposure.
Antitrust liability also lurks as a possible threat to the cooperative
efforts of those health insurance buyers who elect on their own to
share information, 23 analyze data, 24 lobby, 25 and participate

in

purchasing syndicates. 2 6 Such voluntary collective buyer activity
presents at least a theoretical risk of violating the Sherman Act's
prohibitions on collusion in restraint of trade. 27 Moreover, so long as
21 Fee-for-service insurance was expected to be elected by only a small minority of
Americans because it was predicted to be more expensive than other plans.
22
HSA, supra note 1, Title I, Subtitle D, § 1322(c) (2)-(7). This convoluted section
does not grant antitrust immunity directly, but purports to define certain collective provider activity concerning price as state action, so as to piggyback on the exemption created
by the judiciary in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) for state economic regulation.
Such doctrinal manipulation by Congress subverts the federalism concerns underlying the
constitutional raison d'&tre for the exemption. See infra text accompanying note 127.
23
See, e.g., Alex Barnum, CorporationsTeam Up to Battle Health Care Costs, S.F. CHRON.,
March 18, 1994, at B1; FurtherReforms Necessary to Improve F1loridaProgram,LegislatorAsserts, 2
Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 21 (May 23, 1994) (claiming additional legislation required
to improve access to coverage in Florida); WASH. REv. CODE § 43.72.080 (Supp. 1994) (establishing an information clearinghouse for purchasing cooperatives).
24 Cf Mike Oliver, ForidaHospitals Check Grades on 1st Report Cards, ORLANDO SENnNEL, Jan. 25, 1994, at A2 (describing Consumer Guide to Hospital Performance, reporting
hospital outcome data). See generally Smal; Large Businesses in Wisconsin Set Up Health
PurchasingCoalitions, 1 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 37 (Nov. 22, 1993) (employers in
health care purchasing coalition pursuing quality health care reform by looking at costs
and acquiring data). See also Larry Rohter, Employers in Orlando Create an Envied Model N.Y.
TIMEs, June 30, 1994, at B1O (Central Florida Health Care Coalition's collection of data
"lets purchasers see what kind of value they are getting for their money").
25 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 11 (describing lobbying activity in Massachusetts).
26 See California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 2000 (West 1980). HIPC, CAL INS. CODE § 10730 (West Supp. 1994). See generally Susan
Duerksen, State Health Reform: Review and Remedy; InsurancePoolIs Optionfor SmallFirms, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRim., Oct. 27, 1993, at Al (Health Insurance Plan of California enables
small businesses to pool their bargaining power in order to get health insurance rates
comparable to those of big companies); CaliforniaRules ExpandHIPC to Include Associations,
Out-of-State Employees, 2 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 11 (March 14, 1994) (stating that
over 35,986 individuals enrolled in HIPC from July 1993 to February 1994); Michelle
Quinn, California'sHealth Pook Limits, but Lower Rates, N.Y. TnmES, June 11, 1994, at Al
(discussing the concept behind California's insurance purchasing alliance); PrivateSector
PurchasingAlliance Negotiates Rate Reductions with HMOs, 2 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA)
1141 (June 27, 1994) (eleven member companies negotiated rate reductions with HMOs).
See also Bruce D. Platt, A Summary of the Health Care & Insurance Reform Act of 1993: Florida
Blazes the Trai 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 483 (1993) (Florida); Justice Gives Positive Review to
Houston Health PurchasingAssociation, 3 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 411 (March 31, 1994)
(Texas); Small, LargeBusinesses in Wisconsin Set Up HealthPurchasingCoalitions,supra note 24
(Wisconsin).
27 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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managed competition remains this country's basic structural mode for
delivering medical services, the behavior of those purchaser coalitions
possessing market power could be held to constitute illegal monopsonization. 28 Providers and insurers intent on preventing purchasers
from combining to enhance their bargaining leverage have exploited
these antitrust uncertainties. Alliance opponents add bite to their antitrust barking by threatening purchasers with the potential for treble
29
damage liability.

Properly structured and analyzed, collective action by health insurance buyers need not present significant antitrust risk, particularly
if encouraged by legislation. But sophisticated economic analysis
must be employed to determine the precise impact that collective
health insurance purchasing power exerts, particularly as both providers and insurers continue to integrate horizontally and vertically into
ever larger service delivery networks.3 0 In point of fact, courts have
generally treated large health sector purchasers or purchasing coalitions quite leniently in antitrust cases, even in the absence of facilitating legislation.3 1 This coincides with a legal perception that,
notwithstanding pure economic theory (which tends to treat monopsony and monopoly as two sides of the same anticompetitive coin),32
buyer power does not generally present the same risks to consumer
33
welfare as does seller domination.
28
29

Id. §2.
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1988).
30
See generally Mark A. Hall, Managed Competition and Integrated Health Care Deliveiy
Systems, 29 WAKE FoRESr L. REv. 1 (1994) (arguing that managed competition will elimi-

nate solo physician practice, freestanding hospitals, and bright-line divisions between doctors, hospitals, and insurers).
31
See, e.g., Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883
F.2d 1101 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990) (insurer's HMO "look alike"
option with lower cost pricing policy was exempt from antitrust scrutiny, and its "mostfavored-nations" clause in providers' contract did not violate the Sherman Act); Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cit. 1986) (insurer lacking market power cannot be preliminarily enjoined from implementing preferred provider health
insurance plan); Kartell v. Blue Shield, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1029 (1985) (insurer's ban on balance billing practices does not unreasonably restrain
trade); Webster County Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare
& Retirement Fund of 1950, 536 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Union Welfare Fund, providing health care to union members and their families, does not violate antitrust laws).
32
GEORGE STGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 205-06 (3d ed. 1966).
33

Joint purchasing arrangements are "not a form of concerted activity characteristi-

cally likely to result in predominantly anticompetitive effects." Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295 (1985) (emphasis
added). But cf. ROGER D. BLAIR &JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPsoNy. ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1993) (examining the theory of monopsony and its effects on social welfare)
[hereinafter BLAIR & HARRISON, MONOPSONYI; Roger D. Blair &Jeffrey L. Harrison, Cooperative Buying, Monopsony Power, and AntitrustPolicy, 86 Nw. U. L. Rzv. 331 (1992) (analyzing
the procompetitive and anticompetitive aspects of monopsony power and concluding that
per se treatment is warranted more often than analysts have previously thought) [hereinafter Blair & Harrison, Cooperative Buying].
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This Article focuses specifically on antitrust issues involving alli34
ances collaborating with respect to health insurance purchasing,
rather than on the broader issue of group purchases from the health
industry generally.3 5 It emphasizes the special antitrust problems
presented when buyers behave jointly with respect to the health insurance product, either spontaneously or as the result of government
prodding. Part I of the Article describes health insurance purchasing
generally, to provide a basis for analyzing potential antitrust problems.
Part II examines joint health insurance purchaser behavior in light of
antitrust principles prohibiting restraints of trade. Part III repeats the
exercise with respect to monopsony. Part IV analyzes the special antitrust considerations associated with governmental involvement in purchaser activity. Finally, this Article concludes that short of increasingly
unlikely single-payer reform, Americans will probably be better off in
the long run with the competing alliance structures springing up
spontaneously than they would have been with the huge mandatory
alliances envisioned by the Task Force's proposed legislation.

I
HEALTH INSURANCE PURCHASING

A.

General Background

Health insurance purchasing alliances aim to consolidate sophisticated buying clout for a health service product notoriously difficult
to evaluate, price, and police for quality. By pooling information, ana37
lyzing joint outcomes data3 6 and subscriber satisfaction measures,
34 See, e.g., Justice Dept. Won't Challenge Birmingham; Ala. DemonstrationProjec 2 Health
Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 1143 (June 27, 1994) (discussing Alabama's demonstration project
to evaluate hospital services and the Department ofJustice's determination not to challenge the project under antitrust laws); Colorado CooperativeHealth BoardMeets to Define Role
in Ventures, 2 Health Care Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 1140 (June 27, 1994) (discussing Health Care
Agreement Board's purpose to provide protection from antitrust laws).
35 Federal antitrust enforcers have adopted a safe harbor rule whereby they will not
challenge group purchasing arrangements among health care providers if the members
collectively account for less than 35% of total sales of the purchased product and the input
cost represents less than 20% of the final product sales price. Statements ofAntitrust Enforcement in the Health CareArea, Statement No 5,Joint Purchasing Arrangements Among Health
Care Providers, U.S. Dept. of'Justice, Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 15, 1993), set forth
in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. No. 1631 at S-11 (Special Supp.) [hereinafter Statement
No. 5]. See alsoBlair & Harrison, CooperativeBuying, supra note 33;Jonathan M.Jacobson &
Gary J. Dorman, Joint Purchasing,Monopsony & Antitrust 39 Asrrrrusr BuLL. 1, 4 (1991).
36 Cf Wendy K. Mariner, Outcomes Assessment in Health Care Reform: Promise and Limitations, 20 AM.J. OF L. & MED. 37 (1994) (summarizing terms used in outcomes research and
analyzing strengths and limitations of such data).
37 The Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set-Version 2.0 [hereinafter
HEDIS 2.0], a system for evaluating health plan performance, has achieved wide employer
acceptance. HEDIS 2.0 sets forth five performance measures by which employers can evaluate insurance plans: 1) quality (measures performance in delivering selected services); 2)
access and patient satisfaction; 3) membership and utilization (measures membership
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and concentrating buyer strength, employers can bargain more effectively for their workers' health insurance coverage. Theoretically this
enhanced purchasing power stimulates intense competition for business primarily among insurers, and secondarily among doctors, hospitals, and other providers. These rivalries should spawn a more
responsive and cost-effective medical system.3 8
Public or private health insurance is now the predominant medium through which payment for medical services flows to providers,
and the reform proposals introduced in the 103rd Congress all envisioned a more or less dramatic increase in the number of Americans
covered by health insurance. Four of the five bills reported out of
committee stopped short of universal coverage, but all sought to cut
down the ranks of the uninsured. An expanded number of insureds
presents the opportunity for joint insurance purchasing on an even
larger scale, but it likewise expands the opportunities for collusive
buyer behavior.
To make sense of the intense political reaction against mandatory
alliances and the relevance of potential antitrust objections to them, it
will be useful to recapitulate the evolution of health care financing.
Historically, hospitals and doctors billed patients directly for their
services and were free to charge whatever the traffic would bear. They
made up for shortfalls with their own Robin Hood pricing methodologies.3 9 When health insurance became increasingly widespread during and after the Great Depression, charges for medical services
became somewhat more uniform but insurers still reimbursed providers (or indemnified subscribers) primarily on a cost pass-through
40
basis.
The advent of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, as well as the subsequent ascendancy of managed care two decades later, meant that
provider independence with regard to pricing became increasingly
circumscribed. 41 Today purchasing alliances are concentrating buyer
strength even further and are turning the screws on health insurer
pricing flexibility as well. As a consequence, providers fear that their
ability to negotiate effectively about how much insurers pay them will
demographics and stability, along with resource allocation within the plan); 4) finance
(measures performance in achieving financial stability); and 5) descriptive information on
health plan management and activities, such as provider credentialing and utilization review. IIEDIS Executive Summary.
38 See Kathryn M. Fenton, Antitrust Implications ofJoint Efforts by Third Party Payors to
Reduce Costs and Improve the Quality of Health Car4 61 ANwrrrusr LJ. 17, 51 (1992).
39

See generally PAUL

STARR,

THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 385-

88 (1982) (discussing provider pricing policies).
40

See generally SYLviA A. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG 6-18 (1974) (recount-

ing the origins of Blue Cross and its relationships with state regulatory agencies).
41 Patients have also become increasingly resistant to paying for medical care or
health insurance out-of-pocket.
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be completely undermined. Because these coalitions represent a substantial shift of bargaining power away from sellers and toward the
intermediate buyers of health services, insurers and providers have a
joint economic stake in frustrating alliance formation and operation.
B.

Purchasing Alliance Activity: The California Experience

California has been a pioneer in managed care ever since the
1940s, when the Kaiser-Permanente health maintenance organizations
("HMOs") were established. 42 Thereafter in 1960 California created
the California Public Employees' Retirement System ("CalPERS"),
which currently enables 920,000 state employees and retirees to pool
their health insurance purchasing power. 43 Significantly, President
Clinton cited CalPERS as a model for the administration's health sector reforms. Most recently, CalPERS demonstrated its purchasing
strength by cajoling the insurers with which it contracts into cutting
44
premiums by one percent.
Anticipating the administration's plan, California also enacted
legislation inviting private businesses to form purchasing alliances. 45
The Voluntary Alliance Uniting Employers Purchasing Program, referred to as the Health Insurance Plan of California ("HIPC"), is an
optional state program available to small employers with up to 100, or
as few as four, employees. 46 HIPC is the first voluntary, statewide,
health insurance purchasing cooperative in the country and represents a prototype for achieving health insurance reform without mandates. 47 Thus far, 2600 small businesses have joined the alliance,4 8
600 of which did not previously offer health insurance benefits. 49 On
average, covered employees have six health plans from which to
42 See STARR, supranote 39, at 322.
43 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 20000 (West 1980); Barnum, supra note 23. See also Duerksen,
supra note 26.
44 See Duerksen, supra note 26; see also Alex Barnum, Big Firms Flex Health Muscle;
HMOs Cut Rates Up to 10%, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 1994, at DI (discussing success of Bay
Area Group on Health, CalPERS, and the Health Insurance Plan of California).
45 CAL. INS. CODE § 10730 (West Supp. 1994). See Emery B. Dowell & Thomas R.
Oliver, State Report: Small-Employer Health Alliance in California,13 HEALTH Asr. 350 (Spring
1994).
46 CAL. INS. CODE § 10733.5 (West Supp. 1994). Prior to the 1994 revision, a small
employer was defined as one with five to fifty employees. CaliforniaRules Expand HIPC to
Include Associations, Out-of-State Employees, supra note 26.
47
CaliforniaRules Expand HIPCto Include Associations, Out-of-State Employees, supra note
26.
48 Id.; Quinn, supra note 26. HIPC covers more than 48,000 Californians throughout
the state. Regional Health Alliances Emerging in California on Voluntay Basis, 2 Health Care
Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 1300 (July 18, 1994).
49 Robert Hollis, Cheaper Health Insurance; the State's 1-Year-Old PurchasingAlliance Has
Driven CostsDown, S.F. EXAmINERJune 23, 1994, atA18. Two-thirds of the six million uninsured Californians work for small businesses, which currently must pay substantially more
than large companies for health insurance. See Quinn, supra note 26. As a result, ob-
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choose in each region, and a total of twenty-three insurance companies now offer plans to the statewide purchasing pool. 50 Within the
alliance, premiums average fifteen percent less than the commercial
price of premiums available to small businesses. In 1994 HIPC rates
have fallen an average of 6.27 percent, and participating companies
estimate they will achieve more than $3.2 million in savings. 5 1 The
alliance thus gives small businesses purchasing clout while preserving
consumer choice among plans. 52 The HIPC has also had a broader
impact on the whole California insurance industry, forcing nonal53
liance insurers to lower their prices as well.
Once HIPC demonstrated its purchasing success for small employers, certain larger California businesses developed their own private alliance in an effort to reduce health insurance costs. The Bay
Area Business Group on Health ("BBGH"), a nonprofit alliance of
nineteen major San Francisco area employers, collectively negotiates
contracts with health insurers. 54 BBGH accounts for $3 billion in annual health care spending and currently provides coverage for 2.5 million Californians. 55 Furthermore, BBGH recently received antitrust
clearance from the Justice Department with regard to its pooling of
health care purchasing power. 56 It has negotiated insurance premium
rate reductions of five to ten percent and has extracted other concessions from seventeen HMOs. 57 BBGH appears to be the first private
taining health insurance reduces small business profits, leaving many employers unable to
afford to cover their employees. See Barnum, supra note 44.
50 RegionalHealth Alliances Emergingin Californiaon a Voluntary Basis, supra note 48. See
also Quinn, supra note 26; Hollis, supra note 49 (describing Health Insurance Plan of
California).
51
Regional Health Alliances Emerging in California on Voluntary Basis, supra note 48.
Although premiums have declined significantly, health insurance costs statewide rose by 6
to 8% over the same period. Hollis, supra note 49.
52 Hollis, supra note 49. Nevertheless, HIPC has its limitations; its plans restrict the
number of doctors and hospitals a patient can visit, and often the most prominent specialists are not alliance doctors. Also, the HIPC plans do not cover certain kinds of medicines
and procedures. Quinn, supra note 26.
53
For example, Blue Cross, a nonalliance insurer, reduced its rates after the alliance
started. Quinn, supra note 26.
54 Barnum, supra note 44. See also Private Sector PurchasingAlliance Negotiates Rate Reductions with HMOs, Health Care Daily (BNA) (June 24, 1994) (eleven member companies
conduct pooled purchasing and collective HMO negotiations). In 1995, BBGH will include Bank of America, Bechtel Power Corp., Chevron Corp., the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., McKesson Corp., Mervyn's, Pacific Telesis
Group, Safeway, Inc., Union Bank, and Wells Fargo Bank. Actual contracts are between
health plans and individual employers. Regional Health Alliances Emerging in California on
Voluntary Basis, supra note 48.
55
Barnum, supra note 44.
56 Id.; Justice Said Not to Object to Group Purchasingfor Health Care Health Care Pol'y
Rep. (BNA) 9, 35 (Feb. 28, 1994) (reportingJustice Department's acceptance-of the BBGH
plan).
57 The HMOs also agreed to caps on rate increases and to partial refunds if they fail
to meet certain performance standards in customer service, quality of care, and data collec-
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sector California effort launched without government stimulus, and it
58
is already highly successful.
C.

Purchasing Alliance Activity: Other States

Many other states have followed California's lead by enacting legislation either creating5 9 or encouraging60 the formation of health insurance purchasing alliances. These statutory schemes focus on
helping small employers to procure affordable health insurance coverage for their workers. 6 1 All of these legislatively encouraged affiliations are voluntary, and all facilitate buyer information sharing and
group purchasing. They vary from purely state programs; 62 to statechartered, nonprofit corporations; 63 to nonprofit, independent corporations, organizations, and cooperatives.64
While some states have enacted statutes promoting alliance creation, in other jurisdictions private businesses have, as in California's
Bay Area, proceeded to form purchasing alliances without the benefit
of legislation. 65 For example, the Massachusetts Healthcare Purchasing Group, a voluntary coalition of corporations and state agencies,
plans to challenge all major HMOs not to raise their premiums this
year. 66 The Group includes such large corporations as Gillette, Polar67
oid, and General Electric, as well as the state's Medicaid program.
The alliance was established in 1993, and held member premium intion and reporting. Private Sector PurchasingAlliance Negotiates Rate Reductions with HMOs,

supra note 26. For 1995, eleven member companies will negotiate for 300,000 employees,
dependents, and early retirees. Barnum, supra note 44.
58
Barnum, supra note 44.
59 See FLA. STAT. ch. 408.702 (Supp. 1993); MiNN. STAT. § 43A.317 (West Supp. 1994);
1994 N.M. Laws 75; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-18-52, 58-38-25, 58-40-22, 58-41-99
(1994); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 26.13 (West Supp. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE § 43.72.080
(Supp. 1994).
60 See FLA. STAT. ch. 408.70 (Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-01-07.4 (1993);
TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 26.14 (West Supp. 1994).
61
CA1 INS. CODE § 10733.5 (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 408.70 (Supp. 1993);
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.317(10) (West Supp. 1994); 1994 N.M. Laws 75, § 2; TEx. INS.
CODE ANN. §§ 26.13, 26.14 (West 1994); WASH. REv. CODE § 43.72.220 (Supp. 1994).
62 See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 43A.317(10) (West Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,

§ 9413 (Supp. 1993).
63 See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.70(3) (West Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143622(3) (1993).
64
See e.g., 1994 N.M. LAws 75; TEx. INs. CODE ANN. § 26.13 (West 1994); WASH. REv.
CODE § 43.72.080 (Supp. 1994).
65 Examples of private sector employer alliances arising in the absence of protective
legislation can be found both in Massachusetts, Stein, supra note 11, and in Wisconsin,
Small, Large Businesses in Wisconsin Set Up Health PurchasingCoalitions,supranote 24. In Iowa
the insurance industry has initiated a purchasing alliance. Agent-Backed HIPC Takes Off in
Iowa, NAT'L UNDERWRrrnER, May 2, 1994, at 29.
66

67

Stein, supra note 11.
Id. at 83. The Group represents over one million people statewide.
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creases to 3.2 percent in 1994-handsomely surpassing its goal of con68
taining them to no more than 6.4 percent.
II
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF CoLLABoRATIvE

PURCHASER AcTwrry

The Supreme Court originally viewed collaboration among buyers as inherently anticompetitive and historically found purchasers
who act collectively to be guilty of violating both section one and section two of the Sherman Act. 69 Its hostility to joint purchaser behavior
has, however, lessened over the years. The Court's current posture is
more receptive to considerations of allocative efficiency and therefore
70
more attuned to the economies that buyer cooperation can achieve.
Among these are the fact that consolidated purchasing permits larger
volume purchases, which in turn facilitate such efficiencies as promotion and transportation economies, utilization of excess capacity,
warehousing and inventory savings, and economies of scale. Buyer cooperation also saves transactions costs and can counterbalance market
power on the part of sellers.71 Nonetheless, recent cases upholding
cooperative buying schemes against antitrust challenge often concentrate more on the fact that the collaborating buyers lacked market
72
power than on the economic benefits of aggregated purchasing.
HMOs in MassachusettsExceed Goalfor Slowing IncreasesSet By Employers, 2 Health Care
Pol'y Rep. (BNA) 13 (Mar. 28, 1994).
69 See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948) (sugar refiners' agreement on price paid to beetgrowers violated § 1 and § 2);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (theater owners' use of common agent to
negotiate with film distributors was abuse of monopoly power in towns with no competing
theater and violated § 1 and § 2); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
(1946) (conspiracy to fix prices and exclude competing tobacco buyers violated § 2 only);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (conspiracy to raise or stabilize price by buying gasoline on the spot market violated § 1 only); United States v. Patten,
226 U.S. 525 (1913) (conspiracy to comer cotton market by purchasing for future delivery
and withholding from present sale violated § 1 only); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375 (1905) (bidding agreements among livestock dealers constituted an illegal
combination).
70
Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985) (office-supply retail purchasing cooperative found procompetitive). See ROBERT
BoRic, THE ANrrrusT PARADox 263 (1978) (arguing for the legality of price-fixing and
market division under certain circumstances). Cf Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Antitrust Policy & Monopsony, 76 CORaLL L. REV. 297 (1991) (arguing that in many instances the courts have given insufficient consideration to the efficiency implication of
monopsonies).
71
See generally Jacobson & Dorman, supra note 35 (arguing that joint purchasing
counters monopoly power by raising the level of output and lowering prices).
72
See White & White, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Co., 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir.
1983).
68
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A. Joint Information Gathering and Analysis
Health care markets have long been considered notoriously noncompetitive, in large part because reliable product and service information has been either hard to acquire, difficult to understand, or
altogether unavailable. 73 Generally speaking, therefore, programs
solely focused on gathering and exchanging information among
health care purchasers are considered procompetitive; they improve
both the quality and the extent of industry knowledge, thereby helping to redress market failure and enhance competition. 74 Furthermore, the positive externalities which may be captured through the
joint collection and dissemination of information lends a powerful social welfare justification which, absent editorial exhortations to act collectively upon it, should easily outweigh anticompetitive fears. Even
competitor-sponsored credentialing or standard-setting programs
designed to influence consumer choice have passed antitrust muster,
because "private standards can have significant procompetitive [infor75
mational] advantages."
Antitrust problems arise only when information exchanges are
used as a front for unfair methods of competition such as price signal77
ling,76 or for spillover collusion, particularly on purchase price.
Such exchanges are more suspect if they facilitate collusive pricing
among buyers who are also rivals in downstream product or service
markets. 78 Health insurance purchaser coalitions are only coinciden73 See generally CHARTv ScoTr, Antitrust Risks of Sharing Information in the Health-Care
Industry, in ANTITRUST AND HEALTH CARE: CurrING EDGE ISSUES (forthcoming 1994). Cf
Clark C. Havighurst, ApplyingAntitrustLaw to Collaborationin the Productionof Information: the
Case of Medical Technology Assessment 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 378 (1988) (concluding that competitors are vital for the production of an adequate supply of information).
74 United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). See, e.g., DOJ

Business Review Letters to St. Louis Univ. Area Business Health Coalition (DOJBRL 88-4
Mar. 24, 1988), Stark County Health Care Coalition of Canton, Ohio (DOJBRL 85-19 Aug.
30, 1985), and Maryland Health Care Coalition (DOJBRL 82-6 Feb. 19, 1982).
75 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988).
76 Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1988), prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition"-a provision which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has used to condemn price signalling. Ethyl Corp., Docket No. 9128, Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 21579 (1979), rev'd, Ethyl Corp v. F.T.C., 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1983). Cf
Stephen G. Thompson, Antitrust, theFirstAmendment, and the Communication of PriceInformation, 56 TEMPLE L.Q. 939, 940 n.6 (1983) (analyzing antitrust and First Amendment of
price communications necessary to market goods and services).
77 Cf ABA Section of Antitrust Law, INFORMATION SHARING AMONG HEALTH CARE
PROVIDERS: AN ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL GUIDE 12 (1994) [hereinafter INFORMA-

TION SHARING] ("Anticompetitive use of price or cost information can range from overt
price-fixing agreements, to exchanges that facilitate the stabilization of prices, to invitations to collude.").
78 However, mere parallel conduct or other circumstantial evidence (among upstream collaborators) is not enough to establish (downstream) conspiracy within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574
(1986); Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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tally likely to be composed of downstream competitors, however. The
employer-participants usually compete not as sellers of goods and services but only as purchasers of insurance and, usually to a lesser extent,
labor. They cooperate in data collection and dissemination primarily
to become more savvy buyers of health insurance and medical service
products, for which sellers have usually held a marked informational
advantage. Their collaboration thus tends to correct existing impediments to a competitive market structure.
The risk that insurance purchaser alliances will engender downstream anticompetitive effects is therefore presumably very small.
Whatever bargaining advantages accrue from the joint efforts of alliance members will presumably be passed on to consumers, for whose
favor these buyers will be competing with nonmember sellers in entirely different markets. Indeed, some commentators suggest that the
antitrust risk can be virtually eliminated so long as the collaborators
limit themselves to information collection and pursue no common
agenda for subsequently dictating purchase price or eliminating highcost providers. 79 The collected data should not single out individual
providers and should be distributed devoid of recommendations in a
way that promotes individual, rather than joint, insurance purchaser
response. In such a case, the alliance should be completely home free
from an antitrust point of view, unless its members constitute an overwhelming majority of the health insurance purchasers in the relevant
market.8 0
B. Joint Lobbying Efforts
An alliance of insurance purchasers may venture beyond mere
information collection and dissemination and attempt to influence
government, insurer, or provider action, either directly or indirectly.
In that case the antitrust analysis shifts, but antitrust risks need not
intensify. The First Amendment protects cooperative purchaser behavior if it constitutes a good-faith attempt to lobby for legislative
change, 8 ' to secure administrative action,8 2 or to obtain a favorable
adjudicatory pronouncement.8 3 It matters not one whit that the joint
petitioners may otherwise compete as health insurance purchasers, or
even as sellers in downstream markets. That their objective may be
purely to persuade government to fix input prices in their favor is also
immaterial, as would be the fact that the input price they seek to have
79 H. ROBERT HALPER & JOHN J. MILEs, ANTTrrUsT
TIoNs 25-45 (1983).
80
INFORMATION SHAMNG, supra note 77, at 12-17.

GUIDE FOR HFALTH CARE CoAu-

81 Eastern R.tL Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961).
82 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
83 California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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fixed might constitute a large percentage of their common product or
service cost. In the final analysis, the First Amendment trumps the
Sherman Act for the Constitution will always trump legislation. So
long as the parties do not engage in sham petitioning of government,
84
their collaborative activity enjoys constitutional protection.
If the alliance attempts to affect insurer or provider behavior,
rather than that of government, its antitrust posture is somewhat more
delicate. If an implied or explicit threat of boycott accompanies coor85
dinated advocacy, the alliance may run afoul of the antitrust laws.

The mere assertion of a common position, however, does not necessarily constitute such a threat.8 6 Rather, the Supreme Court has declared that some "plus factor" sufficient to evidence a "conscious
commitment to a common scheme" is required before parallel action
rises to the level of collusion within the meaning of section one.8 7 If

parallel retaliatory conduct in fact occurs and additional evidence suggesting a coordinated response exists, the per se rule against boycotts
should apply to the collaborators' behavior, so long as they possess
market power. The Supreme Court has held that without market
power or exclusive control over an element required for effective
competition, the per se offense of boycott is incomplete.8 8 If the lobbying collective lacks that degree of dominance, and controls no ingredient critical to completion, its allegedly retaliatory behavior is
subject to ordinary rule of reason analysis.8 9
84 Id. See also Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 113
S. Ct. 1920 (1993) (holding that objectively reasonable litigation efforts cannot constitute
'sham," regardless of plaintiffs subjective intent). Cf Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 895
F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that immunity from antitrust liability is withheld when
petition activity, ostensibly directed toward influencing government action, is a mere sham

to cover anticompetitive activity). Some would also find the rationale for Noerr implicit in
the scope of the Sherman Act itself. Senator Sherman himself said that the act "does not
interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary associations made to affect the public opinion to advance the interests of a particular trade or occupation." 21 CONG. REc. 2562
(1890).
85 See F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (boycott by
group of lawyers aimed at forcing an increase in compensation was not excepted from
antitrust liability).
86 See generally William E. Koviac, The Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements
Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANrrrausr BuLL. 5 (1993) (discussing the courts' analysis of
explicit and tacit collusion).
87 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984) (quotingJudge
Aldisert in EdwardJ. Sweeny & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 n.2 (3d Cir.
1980)).
88 Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985).
89 See discussion of market power infra part III. Although health insurance purchasers
generally do compete as buyers (rather than sellers), it is difficult to conceive of a lobbying
alliance as controlling an element required for effective competition. Even if an alliance
were composed of all insurance buyers in the region, and expelled a member for whatever
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C. Joint Purchasing
Section one of the Sherman Act outlaws anticompetitive collusion
by horizontal competitors and employers do compete horizontally in
health insurance markets to buy their workers' health insurance coverage. Any naked agreement among employers regarding insurance
purchase price thus courts per se condemnation. 90 Legitimate insurance buyer agreements need not raise naked price-fixing concerns,
however, because efficiency justifications forjoint purchasing abound.
If the buyers can show a colorable efficiency rationale for their collaborative behavior, their agreement will usually be evaluated under the
rule of reason rather than suffer per se treatment. 9 1 So long as the
procompetitive efficiencies stemming from the purchasing agreement
outweigh any allocative inefficiencies, the arrangement should pass
92
antitrust muster.
The Justice Department's "35/20 rules" for identifying potential
market power, which guide the government's approach to joint hospital purchases and mergers, provide a convenient framework for determining when a joint buying arrangement will be likely to attract the
attention of federal enforcement agencies. 9 3 Under this standard,
market power is presumed lacking if the cooperating buyers'
purchases do not exceed thirty-five percent of the relevant market. If
the buyers also operate downstream as competing sellers, and their
joint input purchases represent less than twenty percent of their final
product price, then the end-product market is also deemed to be unreason, the excluded member could nonetheless presumably still free ride on any alliance
lobbying successes.
90 See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948); United States v. Alston, 974 F.2d 1206 (9th Cir. 1992); National Macaroni Mfr.'s
Ass'n v. F.T.C., 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v. Seville Indus. Mach., 696 F.
Supp. 986 (D.N.J. 1988).
91 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (sellers'
joint pricing venture passed muster under rule of reason where product could not be offered at all without joint selling agreement). Cf National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (NCAA television plan violated § 1
of the Sherman Act under rule of reason where horizontal restraints fixed price of telecasts
and limited number of televised football games); Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists
Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding exhibitor participation in motion
picture split agreement was not per se illegal under the Sherman Act).
92 Cf Blair & Harrison, CooperativeBuying, supra note 33, at 342-49 (1992).
93 Statement No. 5, supra note 35. This antitrust "safe harbor" is specifically directed
to joint provider purchases, but it reflects the enforcement agencies' general approach to
levels of market share that raise antitrust concern. See also Dept. ofJustice Business Review
Letter to Hong Kong Shippers' Ass'n (DOJBRL 86-12 July 11, 1986) (so long as shippers'
association membership has total volume of less than 35 percent of available transportation
capacity, it is unlikely to have monopsony power over freight weights, and so long as transportation costs are less than 20% of price on delivery, association members are not likely to
be able to collude on price).
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harmed by any anticompetitive effects of their joint purchasing
arrangement.
For those agreements falling outside this safe harbor, antitrust
risks can be reduced by implementing three safeguards suggested by
the DOJ and the FTC, two of which are specifically designed to guard
against spillover collusion. 94 As previously noted, downstream spillover collusion is unlikely among cooperating health insurance purchasers because they will compete as sellers in product or service
markets only coincidentally. Spillover collusion is possible upstream,
however, where members of an alliance are rivals for employees in
tight labor markets.

95

Participants should therefore be alert to the

dangers presented by, for example, discussing "appropriate" wages to
accompany the health insurance employee fringe benefit they collaborate to purchase. Federal antitrust concerns also may be alleviated
when the cooperating members do not pledge to use the purchasing
arrangement exclusively, but remain free to strike other bargains for
96
obtaining health insurance.
Applying the safe harbor criteria to health insurance buyer collaboration immediately highlights one salient point. Unlike most
joint purchasing arrangements, where the participants seek to obtain
lower prices for inputs to a relatively homogeneous final commodity,
alliance members rarely compete as sellers in the same product or
service markets. They may compete as buyers in the same labor pool
for employees, but their end products are likely to be as widely disparate as potato chips and microchips. Thus the twenty percent prong
of the 35/20 rule simply does not apply, and no successive monopoly
dangers therefore exist. With regard to the thirty-five percent prong,
only nonmetropolitan areas currently hold the potential for exceeding the protective cutoff point for the kind of voluntary health insurance purchasing alliances currently springing up over the country.97
Although the enforcement agencies' 35/20 standard does not
specifically apply to health insurance joint purchases, and certainly
does not purport to bar private plaintiffs from pursuing their own antitrust claims, it nonetheless functions as a useful proxy for determinSee Statement No. 5, supra note 35.
Id. at S-13. Antitrust risk is reduced if an independent employee or agent conducts
negotiations on behalf of the joint purchasers. Antitrust concern is also lessened when
communications between the purchasing group and each individual participant are kept
confidential and not discussed with or disseminated to the other members.
96
Id. at 30. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 n.54 (1984); Joseph Brodley, joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95
HARV.L. REv. 1523, 1555-60 (1982).
97
Cf.Richard Kronick et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform: The Demographic
Limitations of Managed Competition, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 148 (Jan. 14, 1993) (study found
that only medium sized and large metropolitan areas could support three independent
plans).
94
95
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ing when collective activity among alliance members might offend the
antitrust laws. Separate alliances operating in the same insurance
markets which escape scrutiny under the 35/20 rules individually
might nonetheless still court antitrust problems should theyjointly exceed the threshold by behaving collectively in an anticompetitive
manner.
Under the administration's reform proposal the situation would
have been quite different, for the mandatory regional alliances
could-and in many cases probably would-have been statewide.9 8
Exclusionary practices would not have been an antitrust issue because
state-established alliances would have been required to serve all employers in the region not electing to form a corporate alliance. Fewer
than 1000 businesses in the country employ the 5000 employees which
the Task Force's plan would have required before an employer could
elect to form its own corporate alliance, however.9 9 Thus, there would
have been little, if any, competition among alliances within states for
insurer contracts under the administration proposal. There would,
however, presumably have been intense rivalry among insurers for the
favor of these very large purchaser groups. The threat of monopsony
pricing would thus not have been merely theoretical.
III
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF MONOPSONISTIC

PURCHASER AcTrr
Section two of the Sherman Act' 0 0 condemns the willful acquisition of monopoly-the power to limit output and raise price unilaterallym-on the part of sellers. 01' The Supreme Court has also construed
section two to outlaw monopsonization, which is the structural flip
side to monopoly. 0 2 The monopsonistic buyer or purchasing coalition has unilateral power to depress input price by restricting
purchases and can wield it to take predatory advantage of an upwardsloping supply curve. 10 3 Social welfare losses occur when the monopsonist flexes its pricing muscle by restricting purchases artificially.
98
See generally HSA, supra note 1, Title I, Subtitle D (1993) (outlining structure and
functions of alliances).
99
Of the nonelderly population, 85-90% would thus presumably have received health
insurance through regional alliances. Patricelli, supra note 6.
100 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
101 See 4 PHiLuP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrrRusT LAw 200-06 (1980); LAwRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTrrruST 292 (1977).

102

Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 223-24

(1948).
103 Mandeville Island Farms, 334 U.S. at 219. For general overviews of monopsony theor), see BLAIR & HARRISON, MONOPSONY, supra note 33; CHARLES E. FERGUSON & CHARLES S.
MAuRIcE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 459-508 (3d ed. 1978);JoHN P. GouLD & CHARLES E. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 392 (1980).
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When both prices paid and purchases of inputs are cut back, fewer
resources are employed than would be the case in a competitive
market.
The exercise of monopsony power does not, however, inevitably
reduce social welfare. The larger scale purchasing made possible by
monopsony can achieve efficiencies for both buyers and sellers, including such salutary economic effects as lowered transaction costs
and more reliable long-range planning. 10 4 Moreover, monopsony
power can be utilized beneficially to compensate for previously existing market defects-such as the information inequality which has
long plagued the health sector-that previously worked to the advantage of sellers. 10 5 Rule of reason analysis, therefore, is now generally
10 6
employed by antitrust courts when deciding section two claims.
Those opposed to the Administration's proposed purchasing alliances alleged that they constituted either monopsonies themselves or
facilitated collusive monopsony among their members. The Clinton
Task Force's proposed legislation was not entirely clear about whether
alliances would have been requiredto purchase insurance plans for employers, their workers, or both, 10 7 although the Congressional Budget
Office's official summary of the plan seemed to assume that they
would.' 0 8 Even if the plan's mandatory alliances would instead have
simply negotiated with insurers to channel purchaser choice, 10 9 they
still would have had undeniable economic leverage to extract price
and other concessions either directly or indirectly from insurers, and
consequently from providers. Indeed, health service price reduction
was the main point of the exercise, notwithstanding certain quality
assurance functions that alliances were also expected to perform.
Many regional alliances, and perhaps even some corporate ones,
would thus have fit squarely into the traditional monopsony mold.
That being the case, could their conduct have amounted to illegal
monopsonization within the meaning of the Sherman Act?
See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Antitrust: Transaction Cost Considerations,
PA. L. REv. 1439 (1974).
105 See Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care 53 AM.
ECON. REv. 941 (1963) (discussing the special economic problems of medical care); StanleyJ. Reiser, Consumer Competence and the Reform of American Health Care, 267 JAMA 1511
(1972) (physicians and managers make most health care decisions).
106 SeeJacobson & Dorman, supra note 35. But see Blair & Harrison, CooperativeBuying,
supra note 33, at 333-42 (analyzing the procompetitive and anticompetitive aspects of monopsony power and concluding that rule of reason should only rarely be employed).
107
HSA, supra note 1, Title I, Subtitle D, § 1345 implies that they could have done the
actual purchasing.
108 According to the summary, regional alliances would contract with health plans;
collect funds from employers, households, and governments; and make payments to plans
chosen by participants. Analysis of Clinton Health CareReform Plan, 2 Health Care Pol'y Rep.
(BNA), (Special Supp., Feb. 14, 1994).
109 HSA, supra note 1, Title I, Subtitle D, § 1321.
104

122 U.
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Health sector horizontal and vertical restructuring into much
larger provider and integrated provider-insurer entities was well under
way for many reasons before the fall of 1993, when the Task Force
proposed that mandatory alliances take a leading role in health sector
reform.11 0 These networks were already assuming a more aggressive
stance toward cost containment, on the theory that waste abounded in
health service delivery, and providers had become accustomed to delivering too much care of dubious necessity."1 That on-going structural transformation of the industry had already begun to alter power
relationships among primary care physicians, specialists, hospitals,
and insurers, making it painfully clear that, while primary and outpatient care are assuming more importance, the role of specialists and
hospitals is on the decline. Indeed, a recent highly publicized study
predicts a surplus of 200,000 medical specialists by the year 2020.112
This excess health sector supply has been fostered historically by
an uncritical cost-pass-through payment system for medical services.
Flawed understanding of, and information about, the nature of disease and what actually works to prevent, ameliorate, or cure it also
3
contributed significantly to unneeded health industry expansion."
Because of the preexisting health sector surplus and the cost-driven
restructuring it has recently spawned, monopsonistic alliance purchasing cannot legitimately be blamed for any present "underemployment" of inputs to the health care final product." 4 Any current
provider dislocations represent in at least significant part a market
correction for past overinvestment in hospital and specialist physician
capital. They do not constitute examples of provider flight from the
market in the face of monopsony pricing at or below marginal cost.
With regard to the market power issue critical to monopsony
analysis, the more dominance players eventually achieve on the buyer
side of health insurance transactions, the more the traditional anti110 See generally Mark A. Hall, Managed Competition and Integrated Health Care Delivery
Systems, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1994) (examining the formation of integrated health
care delivery systems as a response to anticipated growth in managed care); Carl. H.
Hitchner et al., IntegratedDelivey Systems: A Survey of OrganizationalModels, 29 WArm FOREST
L. REv. 273 (1994) (examining the evolution of different delivery organizational models).
111
See Gaming the Health Care System, General Accounting Office Report released by the
Senate Select Committee on Aging, Aug. 1994 (health care fraud costs private insurers and
the federal Medicare & Medicaid programs approximately $100 billion per year, or 10% of
United States health care expenditures); Matthew P. Schwartz, Senate Report DetailsRampant
Health Care Fraud,NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Aug. 1, 1994, at 46.
112
David Kroll, The Numerology of GraduateMedical Education Reform, 271 JAMA 1369
(1994).
113 See LYNN PAYER, THE DISEASE MONGERS 1-100 (1992) (how the American culture
.creates" disease); LYNN PAYER, MEDICINE AND CULTURE (1988) (describing the way differing cultures take differing approaches toward what constitutes disease and how to treat it).
114 Only government itself, through its power over the Medicare and Medicaid programs, could presently be construed as a monopsonistic purchaser of health services.
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trust calculus changes on the seller side, which affects both the insurer
and the subsidiary provider levels." 5 Moreover, recent aggregations
of purchasing power in health insurance markets have been matched
by an almost symmetrical consolidation of seller power on the other
side. The highly visible trend toward hospital mergers, physician-hospital organizations and insurer-provider network arrangements reflects substantial horizontal and vertical restructuring of the entire
health sector. This restructuring has created new configurations and
constellations of market strength among all the players.1 1 6
Market power is a constantly fluctuating factual issue on both
sides of any sales transaction, and antitrust evaluation of the dangers
posed by purchaser (not seller) power should fluctuate along with
it."1

Moreover, the Supreme Court's 1992 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image

Technical Services"8 opinion, involving a summary judgment in an alleged tying and monopolization context, deals a new wild card into
traditional market power analysis. The decision emphasizes fact based
rather than theoretical determinations of market strength. The opinion highlights the kind of market defects that can undermine the
cross elasticity of demand in situations where interbrand competition
would ordinarily exist but does not because of these defects, thereby
creating derivative market power in players with relatively small primary market shares.
In Kodak the Supreme Court refused to hold that the defendantmanufacturer's mere fractional share of all photocopier equipment
sales absolutely precluded its ability to force purchases in servicing
aftermarkets. The case involved a photocopier seller who conditioned
the sale of unique replacement parts, for which it was the dominant
supplier, on purchases of its own servicing contracts. The defendant's
allegedly anticompetitive behavior effectively forced the plaintiff's independent servicing organizations out of business.
The Supreme Court's opinion broke new ground by focusing its
analysis on the anticompetitive impact of certain market imperfections, rather than relying on the assumption that small market share
precluded the presence of market power." 9 The Court specifically
115 See, e.g., United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D. P.C., 974 F.2d 1206, 1214 (9th
Cir. 1992) (Health care providers "face an unusual situation that may legitimate certain
collective actions" in dealing with payers who "use the clout of their consumer base to drive

down health care service fees.").
116
117

See generally Hall, supra note 30, at 1; Hitchner et al., supra note 110, at 273.

See generally Barbara A. White, CountervailingPower-DifferentRules for Different Markets? Conduct and Context in AntitrustLaw andEconomics, 41 DuE LJ. 1045 (1992) (advocating new methodology for analyzing antitrust problems).
118 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
119 In order for the per se tying offense, with which Kodak was charged in the Sherman Act § 1 claim, to be complete the defendant must possess market power in the tying
product. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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identified photocopier market information gaps and switching costsboth of which are also endemic to the health sector120 -as impediments to interbrand competition. It found that defendant-Kodak
could indeed possess market power in photocopier aftermarkets,
notwithstanding a minuscule primary market share.'2 1 Kodak would
therefore be in a position to exploit that power anticompetitively.
Purchasing alliances are positioned on the buyer side of health
insurance sales transactions, and the insurance purchase is the only
exchange contemplated between the parties. 122 By way of contrast,
the Kodak analysis is directed toward multiple-transaction seller activity
and, if read narrowly, would not apply to alliance activity at all. The
Supreme Court's reasoning in Kodak may nonetheless be relevant in
any antitrust case-such as one involving allegedly monopsonistic
health insurance purchasing-where market power becomes an issue
and procompetitive justifications for the challenged behavior prove
illusory. Thus even an alliance whose contracts constituted only a
small percentage of total purchases in the relevant health insurance
market might be accused of monopsonization, if information gaps
and switching costs were considered significant impediments to the
ability of insurers and providers to market their products elsewhere.
IV
SPECIAL ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO

GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT WITH PURCHASING

Government involvement with private action can significantly affect the antitrust analysis of what might otherwise be considered illegal anticompetitive behavior. Although government-initiated group
purchasing was a prominent feature of several reform proposals
originating in the 103rd Congress, 123 as previously noted the
mandatory aspect of collaborative purchasing schemes quickly fell by
the wayside.' 24 Active government involvement with alliances, which
120
According to one knowledgeable antitrust commentator, "It is difficult to imagine
an industry in which market imperfections are more self-evident than hospital care." Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: Understandingthe Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTRusT Lj. 263, 305 (1994).
121
See Michael S. Jacobs, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law and Their Implicationsfor
the Clinton Health Care Plan, 21 J. OF LAW, MED. & ETics 163 (1993). Cf Eleanor M. Fox,
Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc.-Information Failureas Soul or Hook?,
62 ANrusr Lj. 759, 766-7 (1994) (The Kodak decision "is not essentially a case about

lack of consumer information" but rather "a case about abusing competitors" in allocative
efficiency guise.).
122
According to one commentator, economically harmful ties arise from an exercise
of seller, not buyer, power. Grimes, supra note 120, at 266.
123
(1993)
(1994)
124

See, e.g., American Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(McDermott bill); Managed Care Competition Act of 1993, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(Cooper bill).
See discussion supra part I.
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could have insulated joint purchasing efforts from antitrust exposure
under either the implied immunity 25 or the state action 26 doctrine,
was thus virtually eliminated from federal reform proposals. The state
action exemption may still be a factor, however, in those states which
have legislated on their own regarding purchaser alliances.
A.

Implied Immunity

When the provisions of two federal regulatory statutes are irreconcilable, courts must resolve the conflict. Judges have reasoned that
the most recent Congressional expression of intent should prevail
over earlier ones and have fashioned the implied immunity doctrine
to break the impasse. 127 Courts are reluctant to create immunity judicially, however, on the theory that Congress could always have expressly immunized affected parties had it chosen to do so.128 For
example, Congress specifically exempted the insurance industry from
antitrust liability when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in
1945.129 Thus, judges confer implied immunity from antitrust scrutiny sparingly, and only when Congress enacts a regulatory statute so
at odds with the provisions of the Sherman Act that affected parties
must be protected from the former law's strictures in order to make
the subsequent law work.' 3 0
The Task Force's proposed legislation made no attempt to confer
express immunity on purchasing alliance activity, 131 but a respectable
argument could be made that at least some antitrust immunity would
have been impliedly necessary for federally mandated alliances if they
See National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S.378
(1981); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The Parkerexemption has been extended to
126
125

conduct engaged in by private actors pursuant to state economic regulation when the private actor satisfies the two-pronged test set forth in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (clearly and affirmatively expressed state articulation of regulatory policy and active state supervision). For the Supreme Court's latest
pronouncement on "active state supervision," see F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct.
2169 (1992). Cf. Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for State-Sanctioned Provider CollaborationAfter
Ticor, 62 Arrrrausr L.J. 409 (1994) (examining state legislation purporting to provide
Parkerimmunity for collective provider activity).
127 Cf Note, Antitrust and Regulated Industries: A Critique and Proposalfor Reform of the
Implied Immunity Doctrine,56 TEx. L. Rrv. 751 (1979) (discussing the evolution and proposing revision of the implied immunity doctrine).
128 Cf National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452 U.S. 378
(1981) (participants in health planning process are immune from antitrust scrutiny only to
extent Congress specifically mandated anticompetitive conduct).
129 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
130 Implied repeals are "strongly disfavored, and have only been found in cases of
plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
131 However, the Health Security Act did make a convoluted attempt to protect providers by attempting to piggyback on the state action exemption. See supra note 22.
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had been required to perform purchasing functions. Thus, despite
alliances' monopsony power or their employer members' apparent
collusion on price through the vehicle of the alliance, they would not
for these reasons alone have been deemed to have violated either section one or section two. Since we are unlikely to see federally mandated health insurance purchasing alliances in the near future,
however, the implied immunity issue is for all intents and purposes
irrelevant. A more pertinent government-alliance interplay issue concems the state action exemption from antitrust liability.
B.

State Action Exemption

If health insurance purchasing functions are carried out directly
by an independent state agency or by an agency of the state itself-as
they could have been under the Task Force proposal1 2-the judicially created state action exemption would presumably have insulated
them from antitrust exposure. The state action exemption was fashioned by the Supreme Court in the landmark case Parkerv. Brown,'3 3
and the doctrine respects state sovereignty concerning economic regulation within state borders. The Supreme Court reasoned in Parker
that it could not lightly infer Congressional intent under federal antitrust legislation to restrain states from engaging in their own legislatively directed economic regulation. Principles of federalism thus lie
at the heart of the Parkerdoctrine.
A state cannot confer federal antitrust immunity on private actors
by fiat, but if purchasing alliance functions are carried out by private
entities pursuant to express legislative direction and active state supervision, they can enjoy Parkerprotection. The Supreme Court held in
CaliforniaRetail LiquorDealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.13 4 that if
the two-pronged test of clear state articulation and active state supervision set forth therein is met, private actors involved in economic regulation will be protected from federal antitrust liability.
A number of Supreme Court opinions have fleshed out the contours of Parker,and several of them analyze the protection afforded to
private actors claiming the shield of "state" action.' 3 5 The most important of these for immediate purposes are Southern Motor Carriers
Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States,'3 6 and F. T. C. v. Ticor Title Insurance
132

HSA, supra note 1, Title I, Subtitle D, § 1301.

133
134
135

317 U.S. 341 (1943).
445 U.S. 97 (1980).
F.T.C. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94

(1988); Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48

(1985); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97
(1980); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
136
471 U.S. 48 (1985).
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Co.13 7 Southern Motor Carriersarguably weakened Midcal's "clear articulation" requirement for granting Parker exemption to private actors
because it expressly approved permissive rather than mandatory state
regulatory policies.' 3 8 Moreover, even in the absence of state legislation expressly permitting the challenged conduct, the test can be satisfied so long as the state "has articulated clearly its intent to displace
price competition [in a particular field] with a regulatory
139
structure."'
Ticor, on the other hand, gave sharp teeth to the active supervision prong of the Southern Motor Carrierstest. In fact, Mr. Justice Kennedy expressly reiterated in Ticor that application of the state action
exemption is disfavored.' 40 Although he also cautioned that the
court's decision "should be read in light of the gravity of the [pricefixing] antitrust offense involved," 14 the opinion makes clear that the
state must have "played a substantial role in determining the specifics
of that economic policy' 42 before immunity will follow.
Only two states-Florida and North Carolina-have thus far enacted legislation explicitly professing to offer antitrust protection for
statutorily sanctioned voluntary alliance activity.' 43 These provisions
purport to require such active state supervision over alliance operations that the operations themselves constitute state action and thus
qualify for Parker exemption from antitrust scrutiny. These enactments may not have achieved their objective, however. For example,
the Florida statute reads as follows:
In addition to the duties described in § 408.704, the agency shall
actively supervise the community health purchasing alliances to ensure that actions that affect market competition are not for private
interests ...so as to provide state and federal antitrust protection of
alliances and their board members."'4
State legislation generally exhorting an agency to supervise alliance activity sufficiently to qualify for antitrust exemption does not
necessarily confer protection from federal liability, although it should
provide immunity under state law. Clearly the Florida legislature intended to convey antitrust protection, and with respect to state antitrust sanctions this statute will suffice. State legislatures, however,
have no inherent power to create exemptions from federal antitrust
culpability: In order to provide Parkercover from potential federal
137
138
'39
140
141
142

143
144

112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992).
Southern Motor Carriers,471 U.S. at 60.
Id. at 65.
Ticor, 112 S. Ct. at 2178.
Id. at 2180.
Id. at 2179.
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 408.7041 (West Supp. 1994); N.C.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.7041 (West Supp. 1994).

GEN. STAT.

§§ 143-634 (1993).
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antitrust liability, a state statutory scheme must mandate agency supervision which is more than merely pro forma. Thus each case of challenged private behavior requires individualized factual scrutiny for the
required degree of state involvement before protection will be
assured.
To that end, the North Carolina statute adds a state board monitoring requirement "to ensure that the legislative intent.., to ensure
the competitiveness of the small employer health coverage market is
not impeded."' 45 This provision helps because it adds specific state
monitoring requirements. Nevertheless, an antitrust court could still
find that the board's actions pursuant to its monitoring duties did not
rise to the level of active state supervision required by the Supreme
Court's recent pronouncements in Ticor. Other states have imposed
annual review, evaluation, and/or reporting requirements in their alliance legislation, without specifying that these provisions are intended
to confer antitrust immunity. 14 6 These latter provisions, however, may
not in fact compel the degree of active state supervision required by
Ticor for federal antitrust protection. Even if they do purport to compel it, case-by-case factual investigation is nevertheless still needed to
determine whether the requisite degree of state involvement in fact
occurred.
CONCLUSION

The purchaser alliances on which this article focuses are formed
by employers, primarily to achieve savings on an expensive factor in
the cost of labor: health insurance. These cooperating employers
may still compete with one another as purchasers in labor markets,
but they rarely compete as sellers in aftermarkets, and even then only
coincidentally. Thus any potential for spillover collusion in downstream product or service markets is minimal. The White House Task
Force would have imposed gigantic purchasing alliances with undeniable market power designed to force health service efficiency on employers. That economic model for health sector reform is, however,
no longer politically viable. Instead, purchasers are now voluntarily
organizing into a variety of smaller alliance forms-often encouraged
by state legislation-which compete with one another for insurer and
provider contracts to deliver health services. So long as managed
competition remains the foundation of health care delivery in this
country, these competing alliances probably offer a more effective
mechanism for stimulating provider efficiency than would the monopsonistic health insurance purchaser entities the Task Force envi145
146

1993).

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-634 (1993).
1994 N.M. LAws 75, §§ 6(7), (11), (12); VT.

STAT.

ANN. ft 18, § 9413(d) (Supp.
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sioned. Moreover, these smaller coalitions minimize the potential for
monopsonization abuse because they are less likely to enjoy market
power over insurance purchases and must compete for insurer contracts. Furthermore, any successive monopoly problem is unlikely to
exist because no further insurance-related transactions are contemplated and the participants generally do not compete thereafter as
sellers.
As the health sector continues restructuring into ever larger provider and insurer-provider networks, the effects of increasingly concentrated power on the health insurance buying side in any event
become diluted. The situation could eventually approach one of bilateral monopoly, but in that case consolidated seller power will tend to
check expanded buyer power, and the economic impact of collective
purchaser activity cannot be characterized as inevitably inefficient.
Moreover, the risk of double markup is absent, because employers
who negotiate for health insurance collectively will almost never enjoy
joint market power in downstream product or service markets. As a
result, whatever bargaining leverage they exert as purchasers will
more than likely redound to the ultimate benefit of their employeesubscribers. Generally speaking, therefore, the economic consequences of collective health insurance purchaser activity should be
procompetitive, even though they can only be accurately described in
advance as indeterminate. Antitrust analysis of alliance behavior
should thus continue its journey down the well-trod rule of reason
path.

